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Abstract
We consider a choice of options for a foreign innovating firm to license its new cost-
reducing technology to a domestic incumbent firm or to enter the domestic market with
or without license under convex cost functions. With convex cost functions the domestic
market and the foreign market are not separated, and the results depend on the relative
size of those markets. In a specific case with linear demand and quadratic cost, entry
without license strategy is never the optimal strategy for the innovating firm; if the ratio
of the size of the foreign market relatively to the domestic market is small, license with
entry strategy is optimal; and if the ratio of the size of the foreign market relatively to the
domestic market is not small, license without entry strategy is optimal.
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1. Introduction
We consider a choice of options for a foreign innovating firm to license its new cost-reducing
technology to a domestic incumbent firm or to enter the domestic market with or without
license under convex cost functions. With convex cost functions the domestic market and the
foreign market are not separated, and the results depend on the relative size of those markets.
We will show the following results. In a case with linear demand and quadratic cost, entry
without license strategy is never the optimal strategy for the innovating firm; if the ratio of the
size of the foreign market relatively to the domestic market is small, entry with license strategy
is optimal; and if the ratio of the size of the foreign market relatively to the domestic market is
not small, license without entry strategy is optimal.
In the next section we briefly review some related studies. In Section 3 we present the model.
In Section 4 we study the general case, and in Section 5 we investigate the optimal strategies
for the foreign innovating firm in the linear demand and quadratic cost functions case.
2. Brief literature review
Various studies focus on technology adoption orR&D investment in duopoly or oligopoly. Most
of them analyze the relation between the technology licensor and licensee. The diﬀerence of
means of contracts, which comprise royalties, upfront fixed fees, combinations of these two,
and auctions, are well discussed (Katz and Shapiro (1985)). Kamien and Tauman (2002)
showed that outside innovators prefer auctions, but industry incumbents prefer royalty. This
topic is discussed by Kabiraj (2004) under the Stackelberg oligopoly; here, the licensor does
not have production capacity. Wang andYang (2004) considered the case when the licensor has
production capacity. Sen and Tauman (2007) compared the license system in detail, namely,
when the licensor is an outsider and when it is an incumbent firm, using the combination of
royalties and fixed fees. However, the existence of production capacity was externally given,
and they did not analyze the choice of entry. Therefore, the optimal strategies of outside
innovators, who can use the entry as a threat, require more discussion. Regarding the strategies
of new entrants to the market, Duchene, Sen and Serfes (2015) focused on future entrants with
old technology, and argued that a low license fee can be used to deter the entry of potential
entrants. However, the firm with new technology is incumbent, and its choice of entry is
not analyzed. Also, Chen (2016) analyzed the model of the endogenous market structure
determined by the potential entrant with old technology and showed that the licensor uses
the fixed fee and zero royalty in both the incumbent and the outside innovator cases, which
are exogenously given. Creane, Chiu and Konishi (2013) examined a firm that can license
its production technology to a rival when firms are heterogeneous in production costs, and
showed that a complete technology transfer from one firm to another always increases joint
profit under weakly concave demand when at least three firms remain in the industry. Hattori
and Tanaka (2014), Hattori and Tanaka (2015) studied the adoption of new technology in
Cournot duopoly and Stackelberg duopoly. Hattori and Tanaka (2016) analyzed problems
about product innovation, that is, introduction of higher quality good in a duopoly with vertical
product diﬀerentiation.
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3. Themodel
There are two countries and two firms, Firm A in Country A and Firm B in Country B. Call
Country A the foreign country and Country B the domestic country; Firm A the foreign firm
and Firm B the domestic firm. At present each firm produces the same good in each country.
Firm A has a superior cost-reducing technology, and can produce the good at lower cost than
Firm B.
Firm A has three options. The first option is to enter the domestic market without license to
Firm B, the second option is to license its technology to Firm B without entry, and the third
option is to enter the domestic market with license to Firm B. If Firm A enters, the domestic
market becomes a duopoly. Since the focus of this paper is a choice of entry or license by Firm
A, we assume that Firm B does not enter the foreign market. Let p be the price, X be the total
supply in the domestic market. The inverse demand function is written as
p D p.X/:
The supplies of Firms A and B are denoted by, respectively, xA and xB . Thus, X D xAC xB .
In the foreign market the supply of Firm A and the price of the good are denoted by yA and q.
The inverse demand function is written as
q D q.yA=t/:
t is a positive number. It represents the ratio of the size of the foreign market relatively to
the domestic market. If t < 1, the size of the foreign market is smaller than the size of the
domestic market. If t > 1, the size of the foreign market is larger than the size of the domestic
market.
We assume that the cost functions of Firms A and B are convex. They are cA.xAC yA/ and
cB.xB/.
4. General analysis
4.1. Firms’ behavior
(1) When Firm A enters the domestic market without license to Firm B, the profits of Firms
A and B are
A D pxA C qyA   cA.xA C yA/;
B D pxB   cB.xB/:
The conditions for profit maximization of Firms A and B are
p C xAp0   c0A.xA C yA/ D 0;
q C yA
t
q0   c0A.xA C yA/ D 0;
p C xBp0   c0B.xB/ D 0:
Denote the profits of Firms A and B in this case by eA and eB .
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(2) When Firm A licenses its technology to Firm B without entering the domestic market,
the profits of Firms A and B in the markets are
A D qyA   cA.yA/;
B D pxB   cA.xB/   L:
L is the license fee. The cost functions of both Firms A and B are cA. The conditions
for profit maximization of Firms A and B are
q C yA
t
q0   c0A.yA/ D 0;
p C xBp0   c0A.xB/ D 0:
If the negotiation between Firm A and Firm B about the license fee breaks down, Firm A
can enter the domestic market without license. Therefore, FirmBmust pay the diﬀerence
between its profit excluding the license fee in this case and its profit in the entry without
license case. Denote the profits of Firms A and B by  lA and  lB , and denote the license
fee by Ll . It should be equal to
Ll D  lB C Ll   eB :
This equation means that the license fee is determined so that  lB D eB holds. The total
profit of Firm A is
 lA C Ll :
(3) When Firm A enters the domestic market and at the same time licenses its technology
to Firm B, the profits of Firms A and B are
A D pxA C qyA   cA.xA C yA/;
B D pxB   cA.xB/   L:
The cost functions of both Firms A and B are cA. L is the license fee. The conditions
for profit maximization of Firms A and B are
p C xAp0   c0A.xA C yA/ D 0;
q C yA
t
q0   c0A.xA C yA/ D 0;
p C xBp0   c0A.xB/ D 0:
Similarly to the previous case, if the negotiation between Firms A and Firm B about
the license fee breaks down, Firm A can enter the domestic market without license.
Therefore, Firm B must pay the diﬀerence between its profit excluding the license fee in
this case and its profit in the entry without license case. Denote the profits of Firms A
and B by elA and elB , and denote the license fee by Lel . It should be equal to
Lel D elB C Lel   eB :
This equation means that the license fee is determined so that elB D eB holds. The
total profit of Firm A is
elA C Lel :
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4.2. The optimal strategies
Comparing  lA C Ll , eA and elA C Lel , the optimal strategies for Firm A are as follows.
(1) If  lA C Ll is the maximum, license without entry strategy is optimal.
(2) If eA is the maximum, entry without license strategy is optimal.
(3) If elA C Lel is the maximum, entry with license strategy is optimal.
5. Linear demand and quadratic cost functions case
About details of A, B , C , D, E , F , G and H in calculations please see Appendix.
5.1. Demand and cost functions
Specifically we consider a case of linear demand and quadratic cost functions. The inverse
demand function in the domestic market is
p D a  X:
a is a positive constant. The inverse demand function in the foreign market is
q D a   yA
t
:
The cost functions of Firms A and B are cA.xA C yA/2 and cBx2B , where cA and cB are
positive constants such that cA < cB . We consider three cases about the value of t .
(1) t > 2cBC1
cA
.
Then, Firm A never enters the domestic market, and the entry without license case and
the entry with license case in the next sub-section do not exist.
(2) 2cAC1
cA
< t  2cBC1
cA
.
Then, Firm A does not enter the domestic market with license to Firm B, and the entry
with license case does not exist.
(3) t  2cAC1
cA
.
Then, Firm A may enter the domestic market with or without license.
5.2. Firms’ behavior
About firms’ behavior we obtain the following results.
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(1) Entry without license case.
Suppose that Firm A enters the domestic market without license to Firm B. The profits
of the firms are
A D pxA C qyA   cA.xA C yA/2;
B D pxB   cBx2B :
The equilibrium profits are obtained as follows.
eA D
a2A
4.4cAcB t C 3cAt C 4cAcB C 4cB C 4cA C 3/2 ;
eB D
a2.cB C 1/.2cAt C 2cA C 1/2
.4cAcB t C 3cAt C 4cAcB C 4cB C 4cA C 3/2 :
(2) License without entry case.
Suppose that Firm A licenses its technology to Firm B without entering the domestic
market. The profits of the firms are
A D qyA   cAy2A;
B D pxB   cAx2B   Ll :
The equilibrium profits are
 lA D
a2t
4.cAt C 1/;
 lB D
a2
4.cA C 1/:
The license fee is equal to
Ll D a
2B
4.cA C 1/.4cAcB t C 3cAt C 4cAcB C 4cB C 4cA C 3/2 :
The total profit of Firm A including the license fee is
 lA C Ll D
a2C
4.cA C 1/.cAt C 1/.4cAcB t C 3cAt C 4cAcB C 4cB C 4cA C 3/2 :
(3) Entry with license case.
Suppose that Firm A enters the domestic market and at the same time licenses its
technology to Firm B. The profits of the firms are
A D pxA C qyA   cA.xA C yA/2;
B D pxB   cAx2B   Lel :
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The equilibrium profits are
elA D
a2D
4.4c2At C 3cAt C 4c2A C 8cA C 3/2
;
elB D
a2.cA C 1/.2cAt C 2cA C 1/2
.4c2At C 3cAt C 4c2A C 8cA C 3/2
:
The license fee is equal to
Lel D a
2.cB   cA/.2cAt C 2cA C 1/2E
.4c2At C 3cAt C 4c2A C 8cA C 3/2.4cAcB t C 3cAt C 4cAcB C 4cB C 4cA C 3/2
:
The total profit of Firm A including the license fee is
elA CLel D
a2F
4.4c2At C 3cAt C 4c2A C 8cA C 3/2.4cAcB t C 3cAt C 4cAcB C 4cB C 4cA C 3/2
:
5.3. The optimal strategies
We consider the optimal strategies for Firm A in each case.
(1) If t > 2cBC1
cA
, Firm A never enters the domestic market. Thus, its optimal strategy is
license without entry.
(2) If 2cAC1
cA
< t  2cBC1
cA
, Firm A does not enter the domestic market when it licenses its
technology to Firm B. Comparing the profit of Firm A in that case and its profit when it
enters the market without license,
 lA C Ll   eA D
G
4.cA C 1/.cAt C 1/.4cAcB t C 3cAt C 4cAcB C 4cB C 4cA C 3/2 :
This is positive for reasonable values of variables if t > 2cAC1
2
. In Figure 1 we depict an
example of this case assuming cA D 1 and cB D 5. Then, 2cBC1cA D 11 and 2cAC1cA D 3.
Some discussion about Case 1 and Case 2 When Firm A licenses its technology to
Firm B without its entry, the domestic market becomes a monopoly in which Firm B
produces the good at lower cost. Then,  lB is larger than eB plus the profit of Firm A in
the domestic market when it enters without license. The license fee in the case of license
without entry is  lB eB which is larger than the profit of FirmA in the domestic market.
Then, the total profit of Firm A when it licenses its technology to Firm B without entry
should be larger than the total profit when it enters the domestic market without license,
and license without entry strategy is optimal for Firm A.
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Figure 1: Illustration of  lA C Ll   eA
(3) Now consider the case where t  2cAC1
cA
. Let us compare the profit of Firm A when
it licenses its technology to Firm B with entry and its profit when it enters the market
without license. Then,
elA C Lel   eA
D .cB   cA/.2cAt C 2cA C 1/H
.4c2At C 3cAt C 4c2A C 8cA C 3/2.4cAcB t C 3cAt C 4cAcB C 4cB C 4cA C 3/2
:
This is positive for reasonable values of variables. Thus, elA C Lel > eA, and entry
only (entry without license) strategy is never the optimal strategy for Firm A. In Figure
2 we depict an example of elA C Lel   eA assuming cA D 1 and cB D 5.
Comparing the profit of Firm A when it licenses its technology to Firm B with entry and
its profit when it licenses its technology to Firm B without entry yields
elA C Lel   . lA C Ll/ D
a2.cAt   2cA   1/I
4.cA C 1/.cAt C 1/.4c2At C 3cAt C 4c2A C 8cA C 3/2
where
I D 12c3At2 C 11c2At2 C 4c3At C 18c2At C 12cAt   8c3A   12c2A   2cA C 1:
This depends on the values of t and cA, but does not depend on the value of cB . Solving
elA C Lel   . lA C Ll/ D 0, we obtain the following solution.
t D
.cA C 1/
q
100c2A C 68cA C 25   2c2A   9cA   6
12c2A C 11cA
:
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Figure 2: Illustration of elA C Lel   eA
This is the threshold value of the relative size of the foreign market to the domestic
market. It depends on only cA. If t < t,  lA C Ll < elA C Lel , and if t > t,
 lA C Ll > elA C Lel . Thus, if the foreign market is small relatively to the domestic
market, license with entry strategy is optimal for Firm A, and if the foreign market is
not small relatively to the domestic market, license without entry strategy is optimal. In
Figure 3 we depict an example of elA C Lel   . lA C Ll/ assuming cA D 1.
When cA 
p
2 1
2
, t  0. Therefore, if cA 
p
2 1
2
, there is no positive t, and license
without entry strategy is optimal. In Figure 4 we depict the relation between cA and t.
Some discussion about Case 3 Let us provide some intuition behind this result. If
the foreign innovating firm chooses license without entry strategy, the domestic market
becomes a monopoly, and the incumbent firm gets the large profit. Then, the license fee
is large, and as larger the magnitude of the innovation (the smaller the value of cA is),
the larger the license fee is. If the foreign market is not small relatively to the domestic
market, the profit of the foreign firm when it enters the domestic market as a duopolist
is small relatively to the profit it earns in the foreign market as a monopolist. Therefore,
if the size of the foreign market is not small, the foreign innovating firm does not have
an incentive to enter the domestic market. On the other hand, if the size of the foreign
market is small and the magnitude of the innovation is not so large, its total profit when
it enters the domestic market with license is larger than the total profit when it chooses
license without entry strategy.
We have shown the following results.
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Figure 3: Illustration of elA C Lel   . lA C Ll/
Proposition 1. (1) When t > 2cBC1
cA
or 2cAC1
cA
< t  2cBC1
cA
, Firm A never enters the
domestic market, and its optimal strategy is to license without entry.
(2) When t  2cAC1
cA
;
i) Entry without license strategy is never the optimal strategy for Firm A.
ii) If the ratio of the size of the foreign market relatively to the domestic market is
small, license with entry strategy is optimal for Firm A.
iii) If the ratio of the size of the foreign market relatively to the domestic market is not
small, license without entry strategy is optimal for Firm A.
iv) If cA is small (cA 
p
2 1
2
), license without entry strategy is always optimal.
6. Concluding Remark
We have examined the optimal strategies for the foreign innovator in international duopoly
when it can enter the domestic market, and have shown that its optimal strategy depends on the
relative size of the foreign and the domestic markets. In the future research we want to extend
the analysis to an oligopolistic situation.
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A. Appendix: Details of calculation
A D16cAc2B t2 C 24cAcB t2 C 4c2At2 C 9cAt2 C 32cAc2B t C 16c2B t C 40cAcB t C 24cB t
C 4c2At C 16cAt C 9t C 16cAc2B C 16c2B C 16cAcB C 16cB C 4cA C 4;
B D16c2Ac2B t2   16c3AcB t2 C 8c2AcB t2   16c3At2   7c2At2 C 32c2Ac2B t C 32cAc2B t
  32c3AcB t C 8c2AcB t C 32cAcB t   32c3At   24c2At C 2cAt C 16c2Ac2B C 32cAc2B C 16c2B
  16c3AcB C 36cAcB C 20cB   16c3A   16c2A C 4cA C 5;
C D32c3Ac2B t3 C 16c2Ac2B t3   16c4AcB t3 C 32c3AcB t3 C 24c2AcB t3   16c4At3 C 2c3At3
C 9c2At3 C 64c3Ac2B t2 C 112c2Ac2B t2 C 32cAc2B t2   32c4AcB t2 C 48c3AcB t2 C 144c2AcB t2
C 48cAcB t2   32c4At2   16c3At2 C 37c2At2 C 18cAt2 C 32c3Ac2B t C 112c2Ac2B t C 96cAc2B t
C 16c2B t   16c4AcB t C 132c2AcB t C 132cAcB t C 24cB t   16c4At   32c3At C 20c2At C 40cAt C 9t
C 16c2Ac2B C 32cAc2B C 16c2B   16c3AcB C 36cAcB C 20cB   16c3A   16c2A C 4cA C 5;
D D16c3At2 C 28c2At2 C 9cAt2 C 32c3At C 60c2At C 40cAt C 9t C 16c3A C 32c2A C 20cA C 4;
E D16c3AcB t2 C 16c2AcB t2 C 16c3At2 C 15c2At2 C 32c3AcB t C 64c2AcB t C 32cAcB t
C 32c3At C 64c2At C 30cAt C 16c3AcB C 48c2AcB C 48cAcB C 16cB C 16c3A C 48c2A C 48cA C 15;
F D512c5Ac2B t4 C 704c4Ac2B t4 C 144c3Ac2B t4   256c6AcB t4 C 384c5AcB t4 C 912c4AcB t4
C 216c3AcB t4   256c6At4   96c5At4 C 252c4At4 C 81c3At4 C 2048c5Ac2B t3 C 4160c4Ac2B t3
C 2592c3Ac2B t3 C 432c2Ac2B t3   1024c6AcB t3 C 896c5AcB t3 C 4768c4AcB t3 C 3528c3AcB t3
C 648c2AcB t3   1024c6At3   1088c5At3 C 780c4At3 C 1080c3At3 C 243c2At3 C 3072c5Ac2B t2
C 8256c4Ac2B t2 C 7952c3Ac2B t2 C 3200c2Ac2B t2 C 432cAc2B t2   1536c6AcB t2 C 384c5AcB t2
C 8144c4AcB t2 C 10064c3AcB t2 C 4476c2AcB t2 C 648cAcB t2   1536c6At2   2656c5At2 C 80c4At2
C 2400c3At2 C 1440c2At2 C 243cAt2 C 2048c5Ac2B t C 6848c4Ac2B t C 8704c3Ac2B t C 5200c2Ac2B t
C 1440cAc2B t C 144c2B t   1024c6AcB t   384c5AcB t C 5632c4AcB t C 9952c3AcB t C 6752c2AcB t
C 2016cAcB t C 216cB t   1024c6At   2432c5At   1152c4At C 1440c3At C 1740c2At C 648cAt C 81t
C 512c5Ac2B C 2048c4Ac2B C 3200c3Ac2B C 2432c2Ac2B C 896cAc2B C 128c2B   256c6AcB
  256c5AcB C 1344c4AcB C 3200c3AcB C 2768c2AcB C 1072cAcB C 156cB   256c6A   768c5A
  704c4A C 32c3A C 400c2A C 216cA C 36;
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G D16c3Ac2B t3   16c4AcB t3 C 8c3AcB t3   20c4At3   11c3At3 C 32c3Ac2B t2 C 48c2Ac2B t2
  32c4AcB t2 C 8c3AcB t2 C 56c2AcB t2   36c4At2   40c3At2   c2At2 C 16c3Ac2B t C 48c2Ac2B t
C 32cAc2B t   16c4AcB t   16c3AcB t C 60c2AcB t C 52cAcB t   16c4At   40c3At   8c2At C 11cAt
  16c3AcB   16c2AcB C 4cAcB C 4cB   16c3A   20c2A   4cA C 1;
H D32c4AcB t3 C 40c3AcB t3 C 40c4At3 C 42c3At3 C 96c4AcB t2 C 160c3AcB t2 C 76c2AcB t2 C 112c4At2
C 198c3At2 C 87c2At2 C 96c4AcB t C 200c3AcB t C 132c2AcB t C 32cAcB t C 104c4At C 244c3At C 188c2At
C 48cAt C 32c4AcB C 80c3AcB C 56c2AcB C 4cAcB   4cB C 32c4A C 88c3A C 84c2A C 30cA C 3:
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